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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - LANDLORD AND TENANT - INSTALLMENT
RENT PAYMENTS - Defendant rented a farm from plaintiff under a written
lease for five years and then held over under the same terms by an oral agreement. Plaintiff brought an action for arrearages in rent payments, claiming
that the four-year statute of limitations on open book accounts 1 was applicable,
but defendant alleged that the two-year statute on oral contracts 2 barred the
action. Held, the two-year statute was applicable and barred the action. When
rent is payable in specified monthly sums, the statute runs from the respective
date when each installment falls due. Tillson v. Peters, 41 Cal. App. (2d) 671,
107 P. (2d) 434 (1940).
Although there are very few cases on the point, it has uniformly been held
that the statute of limitations commences to run against rent claims from the
time when each payment becomes due. 3 Thus the rent cases follow the general
rule of other fields of law that the statute begins to run against a cause of action
from the time it accrues, which is when the holder thereof has the right to
apply to the court for relief and to commence proceedings to enforce his rights.•
In an action based on contract there is a right to sue as soon as there is a
material breach.5 Therefore, if the landlord neglects to sue on the nonpayment
of each installment of rent, he will be barred from any action after the passage
of the statutory period computed from the date when that payment falls due.
The principal case is a good example of the general rule as it is applied to
obligations payable by installments. 6 The few decisions apparently to the contrary 7 support the proposition advanced by some courts that if the contract is
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1937), § 337.
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1937), § 339·
3 Minor v. Kilgore, (Tex. Civ. App., 1896) 38 S. W. 539; Trainor v. Kaskey,.
243 Ill. App. 24 (1926); Lee v. De Forest, 22 Cal. App. (2d) 351, 71 P. (2d) 285
(1937). But see Read v. Ferguson, Barnes & Ferguson, 228 Iowa II91, 293 N. W.
474 (1940), which holds that the statute of limitations does not run until the end
of the tenancy. However, that case involved a continuing account with no stated times
of payment, apparently.
4 I Woon, LIMITATIONS, 4th ed., § 122a (1916) and cases cited.
5 6 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTs, rev. ed., § 2004 (1936).
6 Cases are gathered in 82 A. L. R. 316 (1933).
7 Sharick v. Bruce, 21 Iowa 305 (1866); Iron Mountain & H. R. R. v. Stansell,
43 Ark. 275 (1884); O'Brien v. Sexton, 140 Ill. 517, 30 N. E. 461 (1892); Sibley
v. Stetson & Post Lumber Co., 110 Wash. 204, 188 P. 389 (1920); St. Louis S. W.
Ry. of Texas v. Davy Burnt Clay Ballast Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) 288 S. W.
855; City of Albany v. Leftwich, (C. C. A. 5th, 1928) 24 F. (2d) 297; Rich v.
Arancio, 277 Mass. 310, 178 N. E. 743 (1931); Potts v. Village of Haverstraw,
(C. C. A. 2d, 1937) 93 F. (2d) 506; Burns v. Mitchell, 55 Ga. App. 862,191 S. E.
870 (1937).
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RECENT DECISIONS
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for an entire performance for a lump sum, such as the building of a house 8
or the straightening of a child's teeth,9 the payments promised during the
progress of the work will ordinarily be considered as advances on account rather
than definite installments of a divisible amount, and the statute of limitations will
be construed as running from the time when the whole job is completed. It
would seem that the lease contract is quite unlike the type of case falling within
this exception to the general rule. The lease cannot be classified clearly as an
entire contract, although it is certainly not a divisible 10 one. Payment of rent
has long been considered an independent covenant and enforceable even though
the buildings burn or the lessee be put out of possession by an act of God or
the alien enemy. 11 Yet the lessee's covenant to pay rent is so far dependent that,
if he is evicted by the landlord, the common-law view is that the obligation to
pay rent is suspended for the period of such ouster.12 But whatever the legal
theory may be, it is certainly true as a practical matter that each periodic payment of rent is generally contemplated by the parties as the agreed exchange
for the possession of the premises for that period. In this sense, the lease seems
somewhat analogous to a divisible contract, and it is clear that the statute of
limitations runs from the performance date of each installment if the contract is
a divisible one.18 Moreover, if it be assumed that a lease is not to be treated like
a divisible contract, nevertheless its regular periodic payments make it in that
respect so similar to entire contracts of the installment type that probably any
court would follow the general rule in determining the applicability of the
statute of limitations to rent installments. Furthermore, since the purpose of the
statute is to prevent fraudulent and stale actions from springing up after a lapse
of time, when witnesses are unavailable and the merits of the claim uncertain
of proof, it would seem that the decisions are sound in holding that the statute
should run from the date when each installment of rent is payable.1¼
Reid J. Hatfield

Rich v. Arancio, 277 Mass. 310, 178 N. E. 743 (1931).
Burns v. Mitchell, 55 Ga. App. 862, 191 S. E. 870 (1937).
10 "A contract under which the whole performance is divided into two sets of
partial performances, each part of each set being the agreed exchange for a corresponding part of the set of performances to be rendered by the other promisor, is called a
divisible contract." 3 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTs, rev. ed., § 86oA (1936).
11 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT, § 182m ( 191 2).
12 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT, § 18 2e ( 1912).
18 6 W1LLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., § 2024 (1936).
H 1 WooD, L1MITATI0Ns, 4th ed., 8-9 (1916).
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